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The problem of bullying has been shrouded in myth and 
misunderstanding for far too many years. As educators . . . 
we simply have not taken the problem of bullying seriously 
enough . . . [it] is very much an education priority that goes 
to the heart of school performance and school culture. 
- United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2012, almost fifty million students attended public 
elementary and secondary schools in the United States (“U.S.”).2 
Studies indicate that twenty to thirty percent of students in grades six 
through twelve are victims of bullying at school.3 Forty-nine states 
have enacted legislation against student speech that constitutes 
bullying.4 The surge of interest in anti-bullying legislation and 
research was due to a public outcry against bullying-related student 
suicides.5 In August 2010, the U.S. Departments of Education, Health 
and Human Services, Agriculture, the Interior, and Justice sponsored 
the Federal National Bullying Summit in Washington, D.C.6 Secretary 
of Education Arne Duncan announced the purpose of this federal 
summit, the first on the issue, as a “launch [of the] sustained 
 
1  Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Education, The Myths About Bullying: Remarks at 
the Bullying Prevention Summit (Aug. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/myths-about-bullying-secretary-arne-duncans-
remarks-bullying-prevention-summit. 
2 Facts About Bullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV, 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/news/media/facts/#ftn9 (last visited March 14, 2014). 
3  Id. 
4  The only state without an anti-bullying law is Montana. Policies and Laws, 
STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/ (last visited May 20, 2014); 
see also BULLYPOLICE.ORG, bullypolice.org (last visited May 20, 2014) (reporting that 
as of April 2014, Montana is “STILL the ONLY state” without such a law). 
5  See Samantha Neiman, Brandon Robers &Simone Robers, Bullying: A State of 
Affairs, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 603, 609 (citing Susan M. Swearer et al., What Can Be Done 
About School Bullying? Linking Research to Educational Practice, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 38, 
38 (2010)).  
6 Federal Partners in Bullying Prevention Summit, JUV. JUST. VT. (Oct. 16, 2010), 
http://www.juvenilejusticevt.org/juvenile-justice/federal-partners-in-bullying-
prevention-summit/ (last visited May 20, 2014). 
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commitment to address and reduce bullying.”7 However, no federal 
law currently exists that addresses bullying directly.8 Instead, bullying 
may constitute discriminatory harassment, which is addressed by 
several federal civil rights laws.9 When bullying is based on race, 
national origin, color, sex, age, disability, or religion, it may violate 
one of these federal civil rights laws. A school that receives federal 
funding has an obligation to address and remedy the harassment.10 
On January 5, 2011, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed 
the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act into law.11 New Jersey is one of the 
many states that enacted or recently strengthened their anti-bullying 
statutes. Labeled the country’s “toughest law against bullying and 
harassment in schools,”12 it was enacted just months after the tragic 
suicide of Tyler Clementi, a Rutgers University undergraduate 
 
7  Duncan, supra note 2. 
8  Anti-bullying legislation has been proposed at the national level on numerous 
occasions during the last decade. In 2004, federal anti-bullying legislation was 
proposed in the House of Representatives as an amendment to the Safe and Drug-
Free Schools and Communities Act. H.R. 4776(g)(12)(B), (13)(B), 108th Cong. 
(2004). In 2009, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives titled, “Megan 
Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act.” H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (1st Session 
2009). An amendment to the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act was 
re-introduced in 2009. H.R. 2262, 111th Cong. (2009). In 2011, the Safe Schools 
Improvement Act of 2011 was introduced in the Senate. H.R. 1648, 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
9  See, e.g., Title IV and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–
7 (2012); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012); 
Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012); 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012). 
10  Federal Laws, STOPBULLYING.GOV, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/federal (last visited May 20, 2014). 
11  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.1–32 (West 2012). 
12  Richard Perez Pena, Christie Signs Tougher Law on Bullying in Schools, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/nyregion/07bully.html?_r=0; see also 
Emmeline Zhao, New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Law, Toughest in Country Garners Praise and 
Criticism, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/02/new-
jerseys-anti-bullying_n_946625.html (“The law . . . is said to be the toughest piece of 
anti-bullying legislation in the country.”) (last updated Nov. 2, 2011, 6:12 AM). 
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student who was bullied by his peers for his sexuality.13 According to 
the New Jersey Department of Education, the intent of the anti-
bullying legislation is to “strengthen standards and procedures for 
preventing, reporting, investigating[,] and responding to HIB 
[harassment, intimidation, and bullying] incidents of students in 
school and off school premises.”14 
This New Jersey anti-bullying statute requires school districts to 
follow specialized protocols in reporting and investigating all bullying 
complaints.15 The law does not authorize a private right of action 
against a school district if it fails to follow or implement the law 
properly.16 However, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
(“LAD”) does recognize a private cause of action against a school 
district for student-on-student affectional or sexual orientation 
 
13  Tyler committed suicide on September 22, 2010, three weeks into his first 
semester of college at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. Lisa W. 
Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html?ref=tylerclementi. 
Tyler jumped off the George Washington Bridge after realizing that his roommate 
had set up a video camera recording a sexual encounter between himself and 
another man. Tyler’s roommate was found guilty of bias intimidation, invasion of 
privacy, hindering apprehension and tampering with evidence. He served 20 days in 
prison. Madison Gray, Dharun Ravi: Tyler Clementi’s Roommate Sentenced to 30 Days in 
Jail, TIME (May 21, 2012), available at http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/05/21/dharun-
ravi-tyler-clementis-roommate-sentenced-to-30-days-in-jail/. 
14  Guidance for Schools on Implementing the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (P.L. 2010, 
c.122), N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC. 6 (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.nj.gov/education/students/safety/behavior/hib/guidance.pdf.  
15  See Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15; see also Isabel 
Machado & Carolyn Chaudry, Everything You’ve Wanted to Know About the Anti-Bullying 
Bill of Rights Act, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, Dec. 2013, at 15. 
16  The Act specifically states that it does not alter or create any tort liability. N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-37; see Thomas v. East Orange Bd. of Educ., No. 2:12–01446 
(WJM), 2014 WL 495133, at *13 (D.N.J. Feb, 6, 2014) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to 
use the law as a basis for a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against 
defendant school district). Some have criticized the law’s lack of a private right of 
action against school districts as not going “far enough.” Civil Rights Attorney Comments 
on New Jersey Anti-Bullying Law, SCH. SAFETY PARTNERS (Jan. 16, 2011), 
http://www.schoolsafetypartners.org/law/751-Civil-Rights-Attorney-Comments-New-
Jersey-Anti-Bullying-Law.html (last visited May 20, 2014). 
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harassment.17 When the school district “knew or should have known 
of the harassment but failed to take actions reasonably calculated to 
end the mistreatment and offensive conduct,” it may be liable to a 
student for such harassment.18 
States, local governments, and school districts, in attempting to 
resolve the ongoing bullying crisis within our public school systems, 
are enacting anti-bullying laws and policies that may infringe on 
students’ First Amendment rights. In the implementation of these 
laws, school administrators must balance the need to protect their 
students’ emotional and physical well being with their constitutional 
First Amendment rights. Despite the attempts to strike a balance, the 
New Jersey anti-bullying statute has been critiqued on various First 
Amendment grounds. Some perceive the statute as potentially 
overbroad in its definition of prohibited conduct, and they 
contemplate the law could infringe upon religious and political 
freedoms of students.19 
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District,20 the Supreme Court held 
that a public school cannot punish a student’s speech unless it 
“‘materially and substantially interfer[es] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without 
colliding with the rights of others.”21 Some of these laws, including 
 
17  L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg'l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381, 389-90 
(N.J. 2007). 
18  Id. at 390. 
19  Derek Bambauer, Cyberbullying and the Cheese-Eating Surrender Monkeys, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS, (Feb. 21, 2012, 10:20 PM), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/02/cyberbullying-and-the-
cheese-eating-surrender-monkeys.html. Professor Bambauer was a panelist at the 
Seton Hall Law Legislative Journal’s 2012 Symposium titled, “Bullying and the Social 
Media Generation: the Effects of the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Statute on School 
Administration, Students, and Teachers.” See also Lindsay Nash, New Jersey’s Anti-
Bullying Fix: A Solution or the Creation of an Even Greater First Amendment Problem, 2012 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1039, 1063 (2012) (labeling the New Jersey anti-bullying law as “on its 
face overbroad because it extends into the realm of constitutionally protected off-
campus student speech.”). 
20  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
21  Id. at 513. 
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New Jersey’s, also permit school officials to punish off-campus 
bullying.22 New Jersey’s recently amended anti-bullying law 
incorporates the Tinker standard by requiring that the bully’s speech 
“substantially disrupt[] or interfere[] with the orderly operation of 
the school or the rights of other students.”23 
One of the concerns with the New Jersey anti-bullying law is that 
it is a content-based restriction.24 This federal First Amendment 
principle of content neutrality requires that the government be a 
neutral arbiter in regulating all speech, even when it is unprotected. 
The Supreme Court has clarified that the government cannot pick 
and choose what it will punish even when it is punishing unprotected 
speech. Instead of prohibiting all bullying that is proscribable and 
unprotected under Tinker, the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights 
enumerates certain characteristics that may motivate a student to 
harass, intimidate, or bully another student.25 Some states have 
 
22  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2011) (requiring school officials to report 
bullying that “takes place on school property, at any school-sponsored function, on a 
school bus, or off school grounds”).  
23  Id. 
24  See Part II for a discussion of the content neutrality principle and its 
application in the realm of student speech in public schools. 
25  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2011) (The statute punishes “any gesture, 
any written, verbal or physical act, or any electronic communication, whether it be a 
single incident or a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being 
motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, color, 
religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and 
expression, or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by another other 
distinguishing characteristic that takes place on school property, at any school-
sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school grounds as provided for in section 
16 of P.L.2010, c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially disrupts or interferes with 
the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students and that . . . a 
reasonable person should know, under the circumstances, will have the effect of 
physically or emotionally harming a student or damaging the student's property, or 
placing a student in reasonable fear of physical or emotional harm to his person or 
damage to his property; [] has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or 
group of students; or [] creates a hostile educational environment for the student by 
interfering with a student’s education or by severely or pervasively causing physical or 
emotional harm to the student.”).  
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enacted similar anti-bullying laws with enumerated characteristics.26 
This Note will focus on the issue of the New Jersey anti-bullying 
law’s potential violation of the First Amendment’s content neutrality 
principle. It will discuss whether the regulation of student speech in 
public schools is subject to this principle. This Note argues that the 
principle of content neutrality, in the realm of independent student 
speech that causes a substantial disruption under Tinker, should be 
relaxed when dealing with the regulation of bullying. Specifically, this 
Note will focus on New Jersey’s revised anti-bullying law; namely, how 
content discrimination should be permitted in this context because 
bullying is a serious impediment to the state’s ability to carry out its 
educational mission. Further, the traditional justifications for the 
principle of content neutrality, including the marketplace of ideas 
theory have less force in the context of student speech in public 
schools. Our society’s commitment to freedom of speech must be 
balanced with the state’s need to educate our students— whose 
speech interests in the context of bullying legislation must give way to 
other countervailing concerns. 
Part II of this Note sets out the background of the New Jersey 
Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights and presents potential legal challenges to 
the law. It also discusses the principle of content neutrality and 
applies it to the New Jersey anti-bullying statute. Part III sets out 
relevant case law handed down after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Tinker and explains the application of the content neutrality principle 
in the public school context. Finally, Part IV sets out this Note’s core 
argument and concludes that content-based regulations should be 
permitted in a state’s regulation of bullying in public schools. 
 
26  See e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5.27-23.7(a) (West Supp. 2011) (punishing 
bullying based on “race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital 
status, physical or mental disability, military status, sexual orientation, gender-related 
identity or expression, [and] unfavorable discharge from military service”); N.Y. 
EDUC. LAW § 12(1) (McKinney) (prohibiting acts “based on a person's actual or 
perceived race, color, weight, national origin, ethnic group, religion, religious 
practice, disability, sexual orientation, gender[,] or sex”). 
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II. THE NEW JERSEY ANTI-BULLYING BILL OF RIGHTS ACT AND 
A POTENTIAL CHALLENGE ON THE BASIS OF CONTENT 
DISCRIMINATION 
A. The New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act 
On November 22, 2010, the New Jersey Legislature passed the 
Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act with overwhelming support in both 
houses.27 The legislation became effective on September 1, 2011.28 
The law was enacted after a number of studies were conducted on the 
effects and prevalence of bullying. The legislative findings specifically 
reference, but do not cite, a 2009 study by the United States 
Department of Justice and Education, which reported that thirty-two 
percent of students, ages twelve through eighteen, were bullied 
during the prior school year.29 Further, the study found that twenty-
five percent of the public schools that responded to the survey 
indicated that bullying was an issue on a daily or weekly basis within 
their schools.30 Media coverage of bullying-related suicides was also a 
catalyst for the anti-bullying statute. The legislative findings 
acknowledge that the “chronic persistence of school bullying ha[d] 
led to student suicides across the country, including in New Jersey.”31 
The declared intent by the New Jersey Legislature in enacting 
the anti-bullying law was to “strengthen the standards and procedures 
for preventing, reporting, investigating, and responding to incidents 
of harassment, intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in 
school and off school premises.”32 The statute did indeed strengthen 
New Jersey’s existing anti-bullying law by implementing extensive 
training programs for school staff along with speedy response 
 
27 Anti-Bullying, NEW JERSEY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.njea.org/issues-
and-political-action/anti-bullying (last visited Jan. 12, 2013).  
28  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.1 (West 2010).  
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id.  
32  Id. 
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methods for bullying incidents, among other changes. The law 
requires that teachers and school staff report bullying incidents to 
principals on the same day that the bullying incident occurs. The 
investigation of the incident must begin within one school day, and 
the investigation must be completed within ten school days.33 The 
anti-bullying law is not limited to student-on-student bullying 
incidents, as it also covers staff-on-student bullying.34 However, the 
statute does not apply to staff-on-staff situations.35 
The law’s co-sponsor, state senate majority leader Barbara 
Buono, called it “a powerful message to every child in New Jersey.”36 
However, the initial response to the new anti-bullying law was mixed. 
Many perceived it as legally problematic for the state and public 
school administrators due to potential constitutional infirmities.37 
One school psychologist viewed it as “empowering children to use the 
term ‘bullying’ and to speak up for themselves and for others.”38 
Some advocated that the New Jersey law should become a model anti-
bullying law for other states.39 
 
33  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (West 2012). 
34  John Mooney, State’s Tough New Anti-Bullying Legislation Isn’t Just for Kids, NJ 
SPOTLIGHT (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/08/06/state-s-
tough-new-anti-bullying-law-isn-t-just-for-kids/. 
35  See Machado & Chaudry, supra note 16, at 16. 
36  Adam Cohen, Why New Jersey’s Antibullying Law Should be a Model for Other States, 
TIME MAG. (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://ideas.time.com/2011/09/06/why-new-
jerseys-antibullying-law-should-be-a-model-for-other-states/.  
37  See, e.g., J.D. Tuccille, New Jersey Officials Use Anti-Bullying Law to Suppress Speech, 
HIT AND RUN BLOG (July 3, 2012), http://reason.com/blog/2012/07/03/new-jersey-
officials-use-anti-bullying-l; John Vettese, Are new school anti-bullying laws fair, or 
unreasonable?, LEONORE ANNENBERG INSTITUTE FOR CIVICS, 
http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/speakouts.aspx?name=are-new-school-anti-
bullying-laws-fair&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. 
38  Winnie Hu, Bullying Law Puts New Jersey Schools on Spot, NY TIMES (Aug. 30, 
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/nyregion/bullying-law-
puts-new-jersey-schools-on-spot.html. 
39  Cohen, supra note 39. 
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Critics of the law, however, believe that it is too onerous for 
teachers and too burdensome on the financially strained budgets of 
New Jersey school districts.40 Initially, the anti-bullying statute did not 
provide any funds for its implementation.41 After the law was 
challenged as an unfunded mandate, Governor Christie signed 
amendments that appropriated $1 million in grants to maintain the 
law’s constitutionality.42 
B. The Principle of Content Neutrality 
Another potential constitutional challenge to the New Jersey 
anti-bullying law is a violation of the First Amendment principle of 
content neutrality. The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
government cannot regulate speech based on its content.43 The 
content neutrality principle has been labeled the “most pervasively 
employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free expression.”44 Under 
this doctrine, a law is content-based if its application is contingent on 
 
40  See John F. McKeon, Commentary: Thanks to Gov. Christie, New Jersey’s Suburban 
School Districts are Getting $492 Million Less, NEWSROOM N.J. (July 14, 2011, 11:36 AM), 
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/commentary/thanks-to-gov-christie-new-
jerseys-suburban-school-districts-are-getting-492-million-less; Charles Hack, Hudson 
County School Districts Complain Christie’s Funding for Anti-Bullying Initiative Doesn’t Go 
Very Far, NJ.COM (July 12, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/jjournal-
weeklies/index.ssf/2012/07/hudson_county_school_districts.html (indicating that 
the Hoboken school district only received $154.00 for the implementation of its anti-
bullying efforts). 
41  New Jersey Not Fully Funding Schools for Reimbursements to Implement Anti-Bullying 
Legislation, NAT’L SCH. BD. ASS’N (July 12, 2012), 
http://legalclips.nsba.org/?p=15307.  
42  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-19 (providing reimbursement to school districts 
for program costs); Surveys conducted regarding the financial and staffing impacts of 
the law on school districts revealed that more than $2 million was actually spent by 
school districts in 2011-2012 to implement anti-bullying programs in compliance with 
the law. There remains to be seen whether the law will once again be challenged as 
an unfunded state mandate. Governor Signs Anti-Bullying Amendments, N.J. SCH. BDS. 
ASS’N, http://www.njsba.org/sb_notes/20120327/hib.html (last visited Mar. 5, 
2013).  
43  Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980).  
44  Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 189, 189 (1983). 
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the speech’s message— whether it is the subject matter of the 
message or the viewpoint the message expresses. When a regulation is 
impermissibly content-based, courts will apply strict scrutiny.45 To 
achieve content neutrality, the government must regulate speech in 
both a subject-matter and a viewpoint neutral manner.46 
Subject-matter discrimination occurs when the government 
targets speech because of the subject or topic it addresses.47 Viewpoint 
discrimination is discrimination on the basis of the “speaker’s specific 
motivating ideology, opinion, or perspective.”48 At times, these two 
categories overlap, and the Court itself has admitted that the 
distinction between the two is not precise.49 
The Supreme Court’s concern with content-based 
discrimination is that the government, through its regulation of 
speech, will “suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate 
the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”50 The 
principle of content neutrality requires that the government be a 
neutral arbiter in regulating speech. Federal, state, and local 
governments, therefore, cannot take sides in public debate. 
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court made clear that the 
principle of content neutrality applies even when the government is 
regulating unprotected speech.51 The City of St. Paul, Minnesota 
 
45  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); see also Consol. 
Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 540 
(1980) (“Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state 
action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a 
precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest.”). 
46  Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality As A Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: 
Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 51 (2000). 
47  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 819-20 
(1995). 
48  Id. at 820. 
49  See id. at 830. 
50  Turner Broad Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 641. 
51  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) (“These areas of speech 
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enacted a law which made it a misdemeanor to place on public or 
private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization, or 
graffiti— including a burning cross, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to know “arouses anger, alarm or resent in other 
on the basis of race, color, creed religion[,] or gender.”52 The defendant 
moved to dismiss the charge against him on the basis that the 
ordinance was content-based and thus invalid on its face.53 
The Supreme Court found the ordinance facially 
unconstitutional for a number of reasons.54 Namely, the ordinance 
did not apply to all fighting words— a category of unprotected 
speech; it only applied to those that insulted or provoked violence on 
the basis of certain characteristics such as race, color, creed, religion, 
or gender.55 The regulation of this speech was based on its topic and 
was therefore subject-matter based. Other displays were permissible 
under the ordinance if they did not fall within these specified 
categories.56 To illustrate the application of the content neutrality 
principle to unprotected speech, the Court explained that even 
though the government is permitted to restrict all libel, it could not 
 
can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their 
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)— not that they are 
categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made 
the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable 
content.”) (emphasis in original). 
52  Id. at 380 (emphasis in original). The ordinance stated, “[w]hoever places on 
public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization[,] or 
graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one 
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm[,] or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion[,] or gender commits disorderly 
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. 
53  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380. The defendant and several teenagers were charged 
under the ordinance for burning a cross inside the yard of a Black family. Id. at 379. 
54  R.A.V., 505 U.S.  at 381. 
55  Id. at 378. 
56  Id. at 391. The Court gave the examples of other categories such as “political 
affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality” that could be used as fighting 
words but were not covered by the ordinance at issue. 
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proscribe libel only critical of the government.57 The ordinance was 
also impermissibly viewpoint based, as it only punished fighting words 
that involved these certain categories. 58 
C. Challenges to New Jersey’s Law Under the Content Neutrality 
Principle 
As stated by the majority in R.A.V., content discrimination of 
speech is present when the regulation or policy discriminates against 
speech on the basis of the speaker’s message.59 Whether a regulation 
is content neutral depends on whether the speech regulation is 
imposed to restrict the topic or viewpoint being discussed. When a 
regulation is content-based, the courts will apply strict scrutiny.60 
In R.A.V., the city of St. Paul chose to prosecute the defendants 
under the Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. In the majority opinion, 
Justice Scalia explained that the city had “sufficient means at its 
disposal to prevent [the defendant’s] behavior without adding the 
First Amendment to the fire.”61 The New Jersey anti-bullying statute 
may also be challenged for opening the door to First Amendment 
challenges on the basis of content-discrimination. 
The definition of harassment, intimidation, and bullying in the 
New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act is very broad; the 
categories it enumerates characterize it as content-based on its face. 
The law restricts: 
any gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any 
electronic communication, whether it be a single incident 
or a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being 
motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic, 
 
57  R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 384.  
58  Chemerinsky, supra note 49 (explaining that viewpoint neutrality does not 
permit the government to regulate speech due to its ideology). 
59  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 819-20 
(1995). 
60  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).  
61  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.   
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such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, 
or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by another 
distinguishing characteristic, that takes place on school 
property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus, 
or off school grounds . . . that substantially disrupts or 
interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the 
rights of other students.62 
With the inclusion of the phrase, “substantially disrupts or interferes 
with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other 
students,” the law is punishing unprotected speech that falls under 
the Tinker framework.63 Thus, it is punishing speech that is 
unprotected under the First Amendment. 
However, as demonstrated below, the New Jersey anti-bullying 
law selectively punishes certain unprotected student speech based 
upon the listener’s reaction to the speech and upon certain 
characteristics of the victim, rather than restricting all speech that is 
proscribed under Tinker, or all speech that “substantially disrupts or 
interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of 
other students.”64 
1. Subject Matter Discrimination 
In R.A.V., individuals who used fighting words in the context of 
ideas outside of the ordinance’s enumerated categories would not be 
punished.65 The majority provided examples of other characteristics 
such as “political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality” 
that could be used as fighting words but that were not covered by the 
local law.66 To some extent, the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights 
is similar to the St. Paul ordinance in R.A.V., as it punishes bullying 
 
62  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010). 
63  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
64  Id. 
65  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (“[D]isplays containing abusive invective, no matter 
how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the 
specified disfavored topics.”). 
66  Id. at 391. 
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that may cause a substantial disruption only on the basis of certain 
motivating characteristics.67 By enumerating particular categories, 
namely “race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual 
orientation, gender identity and expression, or a mental, physical or 
sensory disability,” the New Jersey legislature may be challenged for 
committing the same error as the city of St. Paul.68 The New Jersey 
anti-bullying law is seemingly punishing student speech on the basis 
of the subject matter or topic in its message. 
After listing specific characteristics, the New Jersey legislature 
also added the phrase “or by any other distinguishing 
characteristic.”69 This additional wording suggests that the legislature 
attempted to remain content-neutral and therefore within the 
bounds of R.A.V. While this catch-all provision may be intended to 
alleviate any concerns related to content discrimination, it may not 
save the statute from constitutional challenges. A potential challenger 
to this anti-bullying statute could argue that the state is targeting 
certain categories of substantial disruption or interference and 
leaving out others even with the use of this catch-all phrase. 
A challenger could argue that the law nonetheless discriminates 
on the basis of subject matter. For instance, the phrase 
“distinguishing characteristic” may not reach bullying that is 
motivated by certain viewpoints held by a victimized student. 
Consider a student who is subjected to bullying by her peers due to 
her pro-choice beliefs. Is the student’s pro-choice viewpoint is a 
“distinguishing characteristic?” If school officials perceive it as such, 
the bully can be punished. If not, a student who bullies a peer who 
holds pro-choice viewpoints will not be punished, whereas a student 
who victimizes another student for his or her pro-life beliefs can be 
punished, as long as the victim’s pro-life stance stems from his or her 
religious beliefs— a characteristic enumerated in the statute. 
Therefore, the phrase “any other distinguishing characteristic” does 
not alleviate the concerns of content discrimination associated with 
 
67  Id.  
68  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010). 
69  Id. 
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the statute. 
2. Communicative Impact 
The New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights may also be 
challenged as content-based because it regulates student speech 
based on its effect on the listener. In other words, it restricts speech 
on the basis of its communicative impact. In the Third Circuit case of 
Saxe v. State College Area School District, the plaintiffs challenged a 
school district’s anti-harassment policy on First Amendment 
grounds.70 The school argued that the anti-harassment law’s 
application to the students’ expressive conduct was justified as a 
regulation of the speech’s secondary effects and therefore an 
exception to the content neutrality principle of R.A.V.71 The Third 
Circuit rejected this argument on the grounds that the Supreme 
Court has stated that “[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience 
is not a ‘secondary effect.’”72 
The New Jersey statute requires that the speech substantially 
disrupt or interfere with the operation of the school or the rights of 
other students.73 It also requires that the restricted speech be that 
which “a reasonable person should know, under the circumstances, 
will have the effect of physically or emotionally harming a student or . . . 
placing a student in reasonable fear of . . . emotional harm to his 
person[.]”74 The statute further requires that the speech have the 
“effect of insulting or demeaning any student or group of 
students[.]”75 This terminology indicates that the statute aims to 
regulate a bully’s speech because of its emotive impact on the victim. 
As the law punishes speech based on its communicative impact on 
the listener, it thereby raises constitutional concerns on the basis of 
 
70  Saxe v. State College Area School District, 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
71  Id. at 209. 
72  Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 484 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
73  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010). 
74  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010) (emphasis added). 
75  Id.  
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content neutrality. 
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE CONTENT NEUTRALITY 
PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF REGULATING STUDENT 
SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Where a student’s independent speech “materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
others,” courts are divided on whether the regulation on such speech 
must be content neutral.76 The confusion on this issue arose from 
contradicting and confusing Supreme Court precedent beginning 
with the landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District.77 
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker made clear that “First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students.”78 In 
Tinker, officials of a public school adopted a policy prohibiting 
students from wearing armbands to school.79 The officials enacted 
this policy after they were informed that a group of high school 
students was planning on wearing black armbands to school in 
protest of the Vietnam War.80 When the students decided to wear the 
armbands, they were suspended.81 The students argued that their 
First Amendment rights had been violated and sought an injunction 
restraining the school from disciplining them.82 
The Supreme Court agreed with the students and adopted a 
 
76  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
77  Id. at 503. 
78  Id. at 506. 
79  Id. at 504. 
80  Id. 
81  Id.  
82  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
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balancing approach that had been previously employed by the Fifth 
Circuit.83 The Court declared that a school cannot punish a student 
unless her speech “‘materially and substantially interfer[es] with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.”84 The 
majority reasoned that a substantial disruption or a material 
interference could not have been reasonably “forecast” by the school 
officials.85 Indeed, no actual disruption of interference occurred as 
the discussion of the armbands did not interfere with work inside the 
classroom.86 
Although the Tinker standard was framed in the disjunctive, the 
second prong alone has rarely been relied upon. Following Tinker, 
most courts have focused on the first prong of the substantial 
disruption test.87 The second prong, whether a student’s speech 
“collides with the rights of others,” has not earned as much 
attention.88 Some courts have refused to apply the second prong due 
to the Supreme Court’s failure to define or clarify what it meant by 
the phrase “rights of others.”89 In later cases, the Court narrowed the 
extent of Tinker’s reach. 
The Supreme Court in Tinker also addressed the issue of content 
 
83  Id. at 505. 
84  Id. at 513. 
85  Id. at 514. 
86  Id. 
87  Daniel B. Weddle, You’re On Your Own Kid . . . But You Shouldn’t Be, 44 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 1083, 1090 (2010). 
88  Id. 
89  Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children's Rights "Collide": Free Speech vs. the 
Right to Be Let Alone in the Context of Off-Campus "Cyber-Bullying", 81 MISS. L.J. 189, 210 
(2011) (“Court is not aware of any authority . . . that extends the Tinker rights of 
others prong so far as to hold that a school may regulate any speech that may cause 
some emotional harm to a student. This Court declines to be the first.”) (citing J.C. 
ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 
2010)). 
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neutrality in the context of regulating student speech.90 The school 
policy prohibiting only black armbands was especially problematic to 
the Court because it was content-based. Instead of banning all 
armbands that were political or controversial, the school banned only 
those that conveyed a certain message.91 The Court pointed out that 
some of the students wore buttons with Nazi symbols, but those 
viewpoints were not prohibited.92 In effect, the students’ expression— 
opposition to the war in Vietnam— was “singled out” by the school 
officials for punishment.93 The Court stated that such viewpoint 
discrimination, “without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material 
and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not 
constitutionally permissible.”94 Some commentators argue that this 
statement by the Court seemingly acknowledged that the prohibition 
of a particular opinion could be justified as long as it amounted to a 
material disruption under Tinker’s framework.95 In other words, the 
 
90  Tinker, 393 U.S.. at 510-11 (“It is also relevant that the school authorities did 
not purport to prohibit the wearing of all symbols of political or controversial 
significance. The record shows that students in some of the schools wore buttons 
relating to national political campaigns, and some even wore the Iron Cross, 
traditionally a symbol of Nazism. The order prohibiting the wearing of armbands did 
not extend to these. Instead, a particular symbol— black armbands worn to exhibit 
opposition to this Nation's involvement in Vietnam— was singled out for prohibition. 
Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without 
evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with 
schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.”). 
91  Id. 
92  Id. at 510. 
93  Id. at 511. 
94  Id. at 511. 
95  See Alexis Zouhary, The Elephant in the Classroom: A Proposed Framework for 
Applying Viewpoint Neutrality to Student Speech in the Secondary School Setting, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2227, 2237-38 (“Justice Fortas' libertarian tone causes some to overlook 
the Court's intimation that certain viewpoint-based regulations may be 
constitutionally valid in the school setting . . . the Court presumptively concede[d] 
that, in certain circumstances, the state can regulate speech on the basis of 
viewpoint.”); see also Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v. 
Frederick, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 657, 663 (“[E]ven in applying a speech-
protective standard in Tinker, the Court was sensitive to the fact that schools are not 
primarily designed for speech, and that normal free speech standards might need to 
be modified, though not abandoned altogether, in the school context.”).  
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Court seemed to affirm that content discrimination could be 
permissible under such circumstances. 
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
Over fifteen years after the Tinker decision, the Supreme Court 
again confronted an issue of student speech in public schools. In 
Fraser, a student was suspended for delivering a speech at a high 
school assembly.96 Although the district court and the court of 
appeals both struck down the suspension on the basis that there was 
no substantial disruption or material interference under Tinker, the 
Supreme Court placed great emphasis on granting the state and its 
educators more leeway to curtail “vulgar,” “lewd, indecent or 
offensive speech” in schools.97 Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme 
Court did not apply the “substantial disruption” test from Tinker.98 
The Court found the student’s language to be “offensively lewd and 
indecent speech,” and upheld his suspension.99 In effect, speech in 
public schools that is “vulgar,” “lewd, indecent or offensive” is 
seemingly carved out as an exception to the Tinker analysis.100 
Most importantly, the Court in Fraser closely examined what the 
majority in Tinker merely touched upon: the mission of public 
education, and the tension that arises when trying to balance 
students’ free speech rights with the interests of the state and local 
 
96  Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). In his 
speech, the student stated, “I know a man who is firm— he's firm in his pants, he's 
firm in his shirt, his character is firm— but most of all, his belief in you, the students 
of Bethel is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If 
necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts, 
he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally— he succeeds. Jeff is a man who 
will go to the very end— even the climax— for each and every one of you. So vote for 
Jeff for ASB vice president— he’ll never come between you and the best our high 
school can be.” Brief of Petitioners at 3, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675 (No. 84-1667). 
97  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
98  Id. at 683. 
99  Id. at 685. 
100  Id. at 683. 
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government in its role as an educator.101 When the Court declared 
that a student’s constitutional rights are “not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” it clarified that 
the legal analytical framework established in Tinker is not absolute.102 
As the Court later explained in Morse v. Frederick, “[h]ad Fraser 
delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school 
context, it would have been protected.”103 However, since “the State 
has interests in teaching high school students how to conduct civil 
and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of 
educational school activities,” the Supreme Court permitted more 
restrictive speech regulations within the school setting.104 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the analysis it 
utilized in Fraser “is not entirely clear.”105 Lower courts have 
interpreted Fraser as standing for the proposition that there is no First 
Amendment protection for “lewd,” “vulgar,” “indecent or offensive 
speech” in schools.106 When dealing with the regulation of this 
particular type of student speech, courts apply a reasonableness 
standard that grants more deference to schools.107 
In terms of the content neutrality principle, the Fraser Court 
indicated that no content discrimination was present because the 
school did not suspend the student to curtail the viewpoint he 
expressed.108 Rather, the school punished the offensive mode of 
 
101  Id. at 685. See Part III for a discussion on the importance of the state’s role as 
educator and its countervailing interests in educating our youth.  
102  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. 
103  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007) (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682-
83). 
104  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Zouhary, supra note 
98, at 2239. 
105  Morse, 551 U.S. at 404. 
106  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678-80. 
107  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
108  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (“Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students 
wearing armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any 
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expression or the manner in which Fraser delivered the speech.109 
The Court pointed out that this case was different from Tinker, which 
involved core speech and the suppression of a political viewpoint.110 
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
The Supreme Court moved further away from Tinker in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.111 In that case, the school district 
censored two student-authored articles on teenage pregnancy and on 
divorce for the school newspaper.112 The articles were censored on 
grounds that they involved inappropriate subjects.113 The students’ 
challenge of the suspension on First Amendment grounds did not 
succeed; the Court drew a distinction between independent student 
speech, which is subject to the Tinker test, and school-sponsored 
speech.114 Instead of applying Tinker’s substantial disruption test, the 
Court applied a reasonableness standard to school-sponsored speech 
that could be perceived as bearing the “imprimatur of the school.”115 
School-sponsored activities are those that “may fairly be characterized 
as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a 
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty 
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to 
student participants and audiences.”116 
The Court announced that schools can exercise control over the 
“style and content of student speech in school-sponsored activities so 
 
political viewpoint.”). 
109  Id. at 681.  
110  Id. 
111  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988). 
112  Id. at 262-64. 
113  Id. at 276. 
114  Id. at 273. 
115  Id. at 270-73.  
116  Id. at 271. 
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long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”117 In applying this reasonableness standard, the majority 
held that the censorship was not an infringement on the students’ 
First Amendment rights.118 Due to the schools’ valid pedagogical 
interest to regulate the content of these publications, the Court 
concluded that the school’s interest in regulating the curriculum 
outweighed the students’ interest in expressing themselves.119 
The majority opinion did not address content neutrality, even 
though it was discussed in the parties’ briefs and during oral 
argument before the Court.120 However, Justice Brennan’s dissent did 
address the issue. He accused the school officials and the Court of 
“camouflage[ing] viewpoint discrimination as the ‘mere’ protection 
of students from sensitive topics.”121 At least two commentators have 
suggested that some of the Justices were simply not satisfied with the 
content neutrality requirement’s implications for school-sponsored 
speech, and, therefore, the Court did not address it in the majority 
opinion.122 They point to the questions asked by the Justices during 
oral argument. For instance, Justice Scalia posed the following 
question about viewpoint discrimination to the attorney for the 
school district: 
The principal could not exclude an article that discussed 
teenage sexuality and pregnancy of some of his students, 
 
117  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).  
118  Id. at 275-76. 
119  Id. 
120  Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. 260 (1988) (No. 86-836). 
121  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
122  Zouhary, supra note 98, at 2244 (suggesting that Justices were seemingly 
uncomfortable with the viewpoint neutrality requirement’s Catch-22 implications on 
school-sponsored speech); see Susannah Barton Tobin, Divining Hazelwood: The Need 
for a Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in Student Speech Cases, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
217, 227 (2004) (indicating that some of the Justices may have been reluctant to 
include explicit abandonment of the viewpoint neutrality requirement in the student 
speech context). 
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and portrayed the whole thing in a favorable light— in 
effect, sanctioning promiscuity by the students— but permit 
an article that discussed the same topic, but seemed to 
frown upon that kind of activity. The principal could not 
take a position on a subject like that. If he allows sexuality 
to be talked about, he has to allow both the pros and the 
cons of adolescent sex to be set forth. Is that right?123 
Due to the Supreme Court’s evasiveness on content neutrality’s 
application on the regulation of student speech, a circuit split 
emerged in the lower courts.124 The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits maintain that the content neutrality principle still applies in 
the school context.125 On the other hand, both the First and Tenth 
Circuits permit content-based regulations of student speech.126 The 
Eight and Fifth Circuits have reached similar conclusions.127 In the 
later student speech case of Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court 
again avoided directly addressing the content discrimination issue 
present in the context of regulating student speech.128 
 
123  Transcript of Hazelwood Oral Arguments, in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1987 TERM 
SUPPLEMENT 385, 391 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1989). 
124  E.g., Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 443 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 134 S.Ct. 201 (2013) (“[The] Court has not expressly discussed the 
relationship between viewpoint discrimination and student speech.”). 
125  Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 629-33 (2d Cir. 
2005); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
126  Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452-54 (1st Cir. 1993); Fleming v. Jefferson 
County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926-27 (10th Cir. 2002); see Zouhary, supra note 
98, at 2244-45 (discussing the resulting circuit split after Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier). 
127  See B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist. 554 F.3d 734, 740 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(“[V]iewpoint discrimination by school officials is not violative of the First 
Amendment if the Tinker standard requiring a reasonable forecast of substantial 
disruption or material interference is met.”); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 379 
(5th Cir. 2011) (“Not only is there no categorical ban on viewpoint discrimination in 
public schools, our sister circuits have divided over the question.”). 
128  Morse, 551 U.S. at 436. 
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D. Morse v. Frederick 
In Morse, a student was suspended from school for refusing to 
remove a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” that he displayed 
at a school-sponsored event across the street from his high school.129 
The Ninth Circuit applied the substantial disruption analysis from 
Tinker and ruled that the school’s actions violated the student’s free 
speech rights.130 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, disagreed, 
concluding that the poster was not school-sponsored speech and that 
the Kuhlmeier reasonableness standard did not apply, the Court 
analyzed the issue under a different framework.131 
Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion shaped the issue as 
“whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, 
restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”132  Essentially, the 
Court carved out an exception for drug-specific student speech. The 
Court reasoned that the “‘special characteristics of the school 
environment’ and the government interest in stopping student drug 
use . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that . . . 
promot[ed] illegal drug use.”133 
The majority’s analysis of the narrower issue placed great 
emphasis on the harms of illegal drug abuse, stating, “[d]rug abuse 
by the Nation’s youth is a serious problem[,]” and that “Congress has 
declared that part of a school’s job is educating students about the 
dangers of drug abuse . . . and many . . . schools have adopted 
policies aimed at implementing this message.”134 The Court indicated 
that the danger in the case— promoting illegal drug use among 
students— was “far more serious and palpable” than a simple desire 
 
129  Id. at 397. 
130  Id. at 396. 
131  Id. at 393, 403. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. at 408. 
134  Morse, 551 U.S. at 395. 
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by school officials to suppress an unpopular viewpoint.135 The majority 
pointed to Congress’s pronouncement that schools must “educat[e] 
students about the dangers of illegal drug use.” 136 For these reasons, 
the government was reasonably restricting student speech to “protect 
those entrusted to their care.”137 
The dissenting justices criticized the majority for permitting 
school officials to prohibit certain viewpoints in the school context. 
Specifically, the dissent noted that the school punished the 
unpopular viewpoint of promoting student drug use during the 
national War on Drugs.138 Although content discrimination was 
present, the majority and concurring justices emphasized that the 
speech at issue was not political discourse.139 
The concurring justices made clear that they would not have 
upheld the suspension if the school had targeted speech with a 
political message. Specifically, Justice Alito wrote: 
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that 
(1) it goes no further than to hold that a public school may 
restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
advocating illegal drug use and (2) it provides no support 
for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be 
interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue.140 
The concurrence clarified that the punishment at issue was 
constitutional because illegal drug use amongst students is a unique 
threat to students’ physical safety.141 The school district argued that 
 
135  Id. at 408.  
136  Id. 
137  Id. at 397. 
138  Id. at 447-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
139  The majority wrote, “not even Frederick argues that the banner conveys any 
sort of political or religious message . . . this is plainly not a case about political 
debate over the criminalization of drug use or possession.” Id. at 403. 
140  Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
141  Id. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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the First Amendment permitted it to “censor any student speech that 
interferes with a school’s educational mission.”142 The concurring 
justices rejected this argument for such broad authority, warning that 
the “educational mission” argument would grant school boards and 
officials dangerous clearance to curtail political speech on the basis 
of viewpoint discrimination.143 Notably, the concurrence reiterated 
the majority’s reasoning when they warned that any argument for 
limiting the free speech standards in public schools would have to be 
grounded in “some special characteristic of the school setting.”144 In 
Morse, the majority perceived the unique threat to students’ physical 
safety to be the special characteristic.145 
E. Current Complexity of Student Speech Standards146 
In R.A.V., the Court explained that content discrimination is 
impermissible for any type of speech restriction, including 
restrictions on unprotected speech.147 However, the question of 
whether the First Amendment principle of content neutrality applies 
to independent student speech that is proscribable under Tinker’s 
substantial disruption standard remains unclear. 
The Tinker decision, and the Supreme Court cases on student 
speech that followed, demonstrate that independent student speech 
in public schools is analyzed under Tinker and can therefore only be 
regulated if it meets the substantial disruption test. However, this test 
does not apply if the facts of the case fall within one of three 
 
142  Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
143  Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
144  Id. at 424-25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
145  Id. 
146  See Piotr Banasiak, Morse v. Frederick: Why Content-Based Exceptions, Deference 
and Confusion are Swallowing Tinker, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1059, 1091(2009) 
(“[L]ower courts themselves have found school speech jurisprudence unclear and 
difficult to apply.”) (discussing the Court’s school speech doctrine after Morse and 
the application of Morse in lower courts) Id. at 1076-81. 
147  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992). 
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categories.148 The Fraser decision carved out the first exception to the 
Tinker standard by permitting schools to constitutionally restrict 
students’ speech when the speech is “vulgar,” “lewd, indecent[,] or 
offensive and would undermine the school’s educational mission.”149 
Second, the Kuhlmeier decision allows schools to regulate school-
sponsored speech as long as the school’s actions meet a 
reasonableness test. Their actions must be “reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”150 Lastly, Tinker does not apply to 
student speech that may “reasonably be regarded as encouraging 
illegal drug use.”151 
Due to the Court’s lack of unambiguous analysis or pertinent 
discussion regarding content discrimination or R.A.V. in the student 
speech cases that followed Tinker, a circuit split occurred in the lower 
courts surrounding whether the principle of content neutrality 
applies in the realm of regulating student speech.152 At least one 
commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision to not 
discuss R.A.V. in Morse v. Frederick indicates “either the Court does not 
deem R.A.V. applicable to the school setting or that R.A.V.’s 
precedential value is minimal in that context.”153 
 
148  Amanda McHenry, Combating Cyberbullying Within the Metes and Bounds of 
Existing Supreme Court Precedent, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 231, 238 (2011). 
149  Bethel Sch. Dist., No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
150  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).  
151  Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
152  For a discussion of the circuit split before Morse v. Frederick, see Zouhary, supra 
note 98, at 2244-47. Zouhary also points out that the decision in Morse confused the 
lower courts further. Her Note argues that the content-neutrality principle should be 
relaxed in the context of school-sponsored speech and that it should apply with full 
force to the regulation of independent student speech. Id. at 2252, 2261-67. 
153  Adam J. Speraw, No Bullying Allowed: A Call for a National Anti-Bullying Statute to 
Promote a Safer Learning Environment in American Public Schools, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1151, 
1181 (2010). 
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IV. CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE RELAXED IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE CONTEXT OF ANTI-BULLYING 
STATUTES 
Even if the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights and similar 
anti-bullying laws pose a content discrimination issue under R.A.V., 
schools should be granted more leeway to regulate bullying, a danger 
to students, when it substantially disrupts the educational 
environment. Supreme Court precedent since its landmark student 
speech case in Tinker is contradictory and unclear. Most importantly, 
the Court has narrowed its Tinker holding by carving out a number of 
exceptions.154 Although the Court in R.A.V. seemed to require the 
application of strict scrutiny to all content-based speech regulations, 
the unique conditions of the school setting and the state’s role as 
educator both necessitate an alternate approach to restrictions on 
speech that constitutes bullying. Supreme Court precedent indicates 
the Court has been reluctant to apply R.A.V. and strict scrutiny to 
content-based regulations of student speech since Tinker.155 This 
demonstrates that the principle of content neutrality should not be 
applied with the same rigor to evaluate regulations on student speech 
that involve bullying. 
To comprehend the current status of First Amendment 
jurisprudence in public schools, we must take into account a 
recurring premise in the Supreme Court’s decisions since Tinker. As 
discussed below, the Supreme Court has continuously acknowledged 
the interests of the state, local government, and school officials in 
carrying out the educational mission of their schools.156 The Court’s 
opinions following Tinker indicate that certain regulations on student 
speech in schools are permissible in order to carry out this unique 
mission.157 Indeed, since Tinker, the Court has moved away from the 
 
154  See Part III for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s reluctance to apply 
R.A.V.’s content neutrality principle in the context of regulating student speech 
under the Tinker framework. 
155  See id.  
156  See infra Part IV.A.  
157  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 441, 445-48 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court’s school speech doctrine 
since Tinker) (“In more recent years . . . the Court has been much less protective of 
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idea that public schools are a forum for the marketplace of ideas• a 
rationale for content neutrality that many argue has less force in the 
context of public schools.158 
A. The Role of States and Local Governments as Educators 
Repeatedly, Supreme Court precedent has acknowledged the 
interests of states and local governments, including school officials, in 
carrying out their educational mission. As one commentator 
explained, education “is the indivisible process of acquiring beliefs, 
premises, and dispositions that are our windows on the world, that 
mediate and filter our experience of it, and that govern our 
evaluation and judgment of it.”159 Chief Justice Warren once wrote 
“[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition 
of the importance of education to our democratic society. . . . It is the 
very foundation of good citizenship.”160 
1. Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court has recognized that public schools serve as 
“principal instrument[s]” in introducing children to cultural values, 
in preparing them for their future professional careers, and in 
assisting them to appropriately adjust to the environment beyond the 
schoolhouse gate.161 The Court has consistently stressed that schools 
 
speech in school environments and much more deferential to school authorities.”). 
Id. at 445. 
158  See, e.g., KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 243 (2003) (stating that although this concern is more pressing at the 
university level of education, precedent shows that it is also relevant at the secondary 
level); see also Brian A. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of 
Students in the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 
4-5 (1984) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never held that the public school classroom is 
a marketplace of ideas, even though occasional suggestions to the contrary have 
appeared in dicta.”). 
159  Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression 
of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1846-47 (2001). 
160  Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
161  Id. 
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are places where we establish “fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system” and teach the “shared 
values of a civilized social order.”162 The process of public education is 
a process of citizenship, and the Court has indicated that it is not one 
“confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class.”163 More 
importantly, the civic education process encompasses teaching by 
example. Therefore, schools are responsible for teaching the “shared 
values of a civilized social order.”164 
The perception of the government’s unique role as educator was 
continuously echoed in student speech cases following Tinker. The 
majority in Tinker expressed the concern that permitting schools to 
silence student political expression that was not disruptive could 
transform schools into “enclaves of totalitarianism.”165 Justice Black’s 
dissent rejected this concern, and stressed that the Constitution does 
not compel our “teachers, parents and elected school officials to 
surrender control of the American public school system to public 
school students.”166 
The Court in Fraser mirrored Justice Black’s concern for the 
execution of the state’s educational mission. Chief Justice Burger, 
speaking for the majority, wrote that “the determination of what 
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is 
inappropriate properly rests with the school board” rather than with 
judges.167 The Court also acknowledged that a student’s freedom to 
express an unpopular and controversial viewpoint in school “must be 
balanced against . . . society’s countervailing interest in teaching 
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”168 More 
 
162  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 683. 
165  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
166  Id. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting). 
167  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
168  Id. at 682. 
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importantly, the Court wrote that a student’s constitutional rights are 
“not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.”169 
In Kuhlmeier, the Court again echoed these ideas. In quoting 
Fraser, the Kuhlmeier Court clarified that a school does not have to 
accept student speech that is “inconsistent with its ‘basic educational 
mission.’”170 Schools may regulate such speech despite the fact that 
the government may not censor similar speech in a different context. 
The Court made clear that a student’s First Amendment rights must 
be considered in this unique context.171In Morse v. Frederick, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed Fraser’s declaration that “the constitutional 
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings” in light of the “special 
characteristics of the school environment.”172 Concurring in the 
judgment, Justice Thomas acknowledged that the Court, “continue[s] 
to distance [itself] from Tinker, but [it] neither overrule[s] it nor 
offer[s] an explanation of when it operates and when it does not.”173 
The Supreme Court’s precedent at least indicates that the 
principle of content neutrality does not apply with the same rigor in 
the realm of student speech when the speech at issue collides with 
the school’s “educational mission.”174 As one commentator has 
suggested, the Court has had numerous opportunities to clarify this 
exact issue, yet it has chosen not to do so.175 Accordingly, many lower 
 
169  Id.; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing the “special characteristics” of the school setting “that 
make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections granted 
adults and juveniles in a non-school setting.”). 
170  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. 
at 685). 
171  Id. at 682  
172  Morse, 551 U.S. at 396-97. 
173  Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
174  Morse, 551 U.S. at 399 (internal citation omitted). 
175  Zouhary, supra note 98, at 2250 nn.185-86. 
NOTE_GUIDO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2014  5:12 PM 
404 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 38:2 
courts have reinforced the “educational mission” rationale to permit 
content discrimination in the regulation of student speech.176 
2. Lower Court Precedent 
Subsequent cases in the lower courts have echoed the 
importance of the role of the state as educator, and the deference 
that should be granted to a government’s judgment in fulfilling that 
role.177 The Third Circuit case of Sypniewski v. Warren Hills is an 
example of a court granting the state the flexibility necessary to 
execute its educational mission. In Sypniewski, the Third Circuit 
dismissed a content discrimination challenge to a public school’s 
anti-harassment policy on the basis of public schools’ unique mission 
of educating the nation’s youth.178 The plaintiffs challenged the policy 
as too narrow because it targeted only racially provocative expression 
for punishment and thereby amounted to content discrimination. 
The plaintiffs argued that although the school district was able to 
sanction speech that is disruptive under Tinker, the content neutrality 
principle did not allow the school to discriminate between disruptive 
speech that embodies racially oriented themes and disruptive speech 
that does not.179 
The Third Circuit acknowledged that the racial anti-
discrimination policy was content-based and would most likely be 
found unconstitutional under R.A.V. in a different context. However, 
due to the uniqueness of the public school setting and the critical 
function of the state and local governments as educators, the court 
reasoned it was the government’s responsibility to “maintain . . . an 
environment conducive to fulfilling [its] educational mission.”180 The 
 
176  See Part IV.A.2. 
177  See McHenry, supra note 151, at 239-43. 
178  Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 267 (3rd Cir. 
2002) cert. denied, Warren Hills Reg'l Bd. of Educ. v. Sypniewski, 538 U.S. 1033 
(2003). 
179  Id. This argument is very similar to the potential content discrimination 
challenge to the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights; see supra Part II.C. 
180  Id. at 268. 
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court deemed this responsibility, “perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments.”181 The decision emphasized 
a court’s need to defer to the judgments of state and local 
governments, granting them enough flexibility to carry out their 
educational mission. 
In Sypniewski, the Third Circuit paid “due respect . . . to the 
needs of school authority,” and permitted content discrimination in 
its racial anti-discrimination policy as a result.182 The court placed 
great emphasis on the fact that the school district had identified a 
certain class of speech— racial speech— that was “subject to a well-
founded fear of conflict” because of its content.183 The school district’s 
well-founded fear of conflict due to racial harassment was grounded 
in the history of disruption and interference with the legitimate 
rights of other students.184 To exercise its educational mission and 
maintain order within the school, the Third Circuit permitted the 
district to enact unambiguous rules of conduct that “narrowly 
target[ed] the identified problems.”185 
The Third Circuit did not engage in R.A.V.’s content 
discrimination framework, but it emphasized that it was “not entirely 
clear” how the framework was applied to an analysis of this realm of 
free speech.186 Nonetheless, the Court held that “adopting a policy 
limited to racially provocative speech was an acceptable non-
discriminatory response by school authorities to the history of race 
relations in Warren Hills’ schools.”187 In other words, the school 
district had a legitimate basis to enact the formal policy. The court 
acknowledged that such content discrimination would be 
 
181  Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
182  Id. at 268. 
183  Id.  
184  Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 247-49. 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. at 268-69. 
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unconstitutional in a context outside of the school setting.188 The 
Third Circuit also warned that when a school illegitimately 
distinguishes between subclasses of proscribable disruptive speech 
under Tinker, the R.A.V. content neutrality principle might be 
implicated on grounds that the school is disfavoring certain views 
expressed by the students.189 
In a later case, the same court reinforced the substantial leeway 
granted to school administrators, especially in the elementary school 
setting, when it stated that, “where an elementary school’s purpose in 
restricting student speech within an organized and structured 
educational activity is reasonably directed towards preserving its 
educational goals, we will ordinarily defer to the school’s 
judgment.”190 
B. The Marketplace of Ideas Theory Has Less Force in the Context 
of Public Schools 
Supreme Court precedent since Tinker demonstrates that the 
marketplace of ideas theory, a traditional justification for the 
principle of content neutrality, has less force in the public school 
setting.191 Unlike other public forums, the public school classroom is 
not one where “teachers, parents and elected school officials . . . 
[must] surrender control of the American public school system to 
public school students.”192 As discussed in Part IV.A. above, since 
Tinker, courts in student speech cases have repeatedly emphasized the 
government’s unique role as educator— a countervailing interest of 
maintaining a productive educational atmosphere. 
Many agree that pupils in the secondary school context, unlike 
adults and students in universities, make limited contributions to the 
 
188  Id.  
189  Id. 
190  Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2003). 
191  See supra Part III. 
192  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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marketplace of ideas.193 It is appropriate to limit the application of the 
marketplace of ideas theory to the public school context, because 
public school pupils have not reached a level of maturity permitting 
them to make informed decisions. As Judge Posner posited,  “[H]igh-
school students are not adults, schools are not public meeting halls, 
children are in school to be taught by adults rather than to practice 
attacking each other with wounding words, and school authorities 
have a protective relationship and responsibility to all the students.”194 
In addition, content-based discrimination is deemed 
problematic because it creates “the inherent risk that the 
Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to 
suppress unpopular ideas . . . or manipulate the public debate 
through coercion rather than persuasion.”195 In the context of 
bullying in public schools, the regulation of such speech will most 
likely not curtail the expression of a political viewpoint like the 
school district did in Tinker. For this reason, among others, there is 
less of a concern that regulating student speech on the basis of 
content could lead schools to become “enclaves of totalitarianism.”196 
C. Preventing Bullying is a Reasonable Educational Goal 
To fulfill their roles as educators and carry out their educational 
missions, states and local governments must have sufficient leeway to 
prevent and halt bullying in our public schools. As one court 
indicated, the issue of bullying in our public schools is “pervasive; it is 
perceived by educators as serious, particularly in the middle school 
years. . . . It is the most common type of violence in our schools.”197 
 
193  See Lisa C. Connolly, Note: Anti-Gay Bullying in Schools— Are Anti-Bullying 
Statutes the Solution?, 87 N.Y.U.L. REV. 248, 265-66 (2012); Saunders, supra note 161, at 
247-49 (citing John H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 
338 (1979)). 
194  Nuxoll ex rel Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674-75 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
195  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
196  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
197  T.K. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (citing Michaela Gulemetova et al., Findings From the National Education 
Association’s Nationwide Study of Bullying: Teachers’ and Education Support Professionals’ 
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More importantly, bullying disturbs a student’s “school performance, 
emotional well-being, mental health, and social development.”198 In 
Sypniewski, the Third Circuit stated that intimidating another student, 
including name-calling, was exactly the type of conduct that “schools 
are expected to control or prevent.”199 In light of this, the court 
quipped, “[t]here is no constitutional right to be a bully.”200 
At the 2010 Federal National Bullying Summit in Washington, 
D.C., Secretary of Education Arne Duncan gave the following 
remarks: “A school where children don’t feel safe is a school where 
children struggle to learn. It is a school where kids drop out, tune 
out, and get depressed.” The Secretary advised “[b]ullying is 
definable” and “[g]ood prevention programs work to reduce 
bullying.”201 Preventing bullying in our schools is a reasonable 
education goal of state and local governments, as it is a pervasive and 
serious issue that disturbs a student’s educational experience. 
1. Empirical Research Findings: Bullying in Public Schools 
Studies on bullying support what many courts and legislatures 
now acknowledge: bullying is a dangerous impediment to the goals of 
public education. The bullying issue entered public consciousness 
after the media publicized a number of student suicides, including 
that of New Jersey’s very own Tyler Clementi.202 Since then, 
 
Perspectives, in White House Conference on Bullying Prevention, at 11-12 (Mar. 10, 
2011), available at 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/references/white_house_conference/index.html); 
GAYLE L. MACKLEM, BULLYING AND TEASING: SOCIAL POWER IN CHILDREN’S GROUPS 42-47 
(2003). 
198  T.K., 779 F. Supp. 2d at 298 (citing Tonja R. Nansel et al., Cross-national 
Consistency in the Relationship Between Bullying Behaviors and Psychosocial Adjustment, 158 
ARCHIVE OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 730, 733-35 (2004)). 
199  Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 264. 
200  Id. 
201  Duncan, supra note 2. 
202  See Dale Archer, 5 Important Lessons From 4 Tragic Bullying Deaths, FOX NEWS 
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/10/07/dr-dale-archer-tyler-
clementi-seth-walsh-asher-brown-billy-lucas-teenboys-gay. 
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researchers have studied the issue more elaborately. As of 2014, 
approximately forty-nine states have enacted legislation against 
school speech that constitutes bullying.203 New Jersey enacted the 
Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act after a year of research on the harms 
and detrimental effects of bullying in the school setting.204 Such 
research has aided states and local governments in drafting and 
implementing their anti-bullying legislation. The research confirms 
that bullying in the school environment affects both the victims and 
the bullies’ ability to perform in the classroom, their desire to learn, 
as well as their decisions to attend school on a day-to-day basis. 
The findings indicate that the bullying issue is pressing and 
ongoing. Eight percent of students miss one day of class per month 
for fear of encountering a bully.205 Every seven minutes, a student is 
bullied on their school’s playground, and in 85 percent of instances, 
there is no intervention by a peer or an adult.206 Various studies have 
found that missing school due to a fear of victimization “not only 
impair[s] academic achievement, but also hinder[s] future financial 
and educational opportunities.”207 Empirical data on bullying 
confirms that bullying is psychologically detrimental to both bullies 
and victims. 
The New Jersey Department of Education’s report on the 
implementation of the anti-bullying law explains that bullying 
generally starts in elementary school, and peaks in sixth through 
eighth grade. It persists throughout high school but it decreases with 
age.208 The statistics of the Commissioner’s Annual Report reveal that 
 
203  BullyPolice.Org, supra note 5.  
204  Garden State Equality Factsheet: The Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, NJBULLYING.ORG, 
available at http://njbullying.org/documents/FactsheetfortheAnti-BullyingBillofRights.pdf. 
205  N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 15, at 3. 
206  Id. 
207  Robert F. Valois, et al., Peer Victimization and Perceived Life Satisfaction Among 
Early Adolescents in the United States, AM. J. HEALTH EDUC., Sept. 1, 2012 (available on 
LexisNexis) (study evaluating 1,253 middle school students and analyzing how their 
victimization affected their life satisfaction). 
208  N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 15 (citing Commissioner’s Annual Report to the 
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thirty percent of U.S. students in sixth through tenth grade are 
“involved in moderate or frequent bullying either as bullies, as 
victims, or as both.”209 In addition, the detrimental effects of bullying 
on students include serious psychological and behavioral effects that 
manifest themselves in low self-esteem, anxiety, depression, suicide, 
violence, and criminal behavior.210 
Bullying has an especially problematic effect on academic 
performance; it compromises the feeling of safety associated with a 
school’s learning environment. Studies show that poor grades are a 
major consequence of the bullying behavior.211 Additionally, when a 
student witnesses bullying without adult intervention, the student 
begins to assume that the school and the adults are taking an 
apathetic approach to the issue.212 Ineffective regulation of bullying in 
the school environment consequently sends the wrong message to 
students. 
Research and experience demonstrate that bullying disturbs the 
learning environment. As Secretary Duncan made clear, “bullying is 
very much an education priority that goes to the heart of school 
performance and school culture.”213 In accordance with its in loco 
parentis role as educator, the government should be able to combat 
the bullying problem without grappling with the complex issues of 
remaining content neutral. 
V. CONCLUSION 
New Jersey’s revised and reinvigorated anti-bullying law and 
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similar anti-bullying laws may face constitutional challenges on the 
basis of content-discrimination. However, schools should be given 
greater leeway when regulating bullying that substantially disrupts the 
educational environment. Since its decision in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court has granted 
more deference to the judgment of school officials. In addition, 
courts and scholars have reasoned against application of the 
marketplace of ideas rationale to student speech in public schools. 
Content discrimination should be permitted in this realm of free 
speech regulation because bullying impedes the state’s ability to 
exercise its role and duty as educator. 
Our society’s commitment to freedom of speech must be 
balanced with the government’s need to educate our students. 
Students’ free speech interests in the context of bullying legislation 
must give way to other countervailing concerns, especially when 
dealing with punishing student speech that constitutes bullying— a 
pervasive issue that frustrates and impedes the execution of the 
government’s educational mission. 
At the White House Conference on Bullying Prevention in 
March 2011, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan stated: 
I am convinced that we are moving toward a day when 
students will be safe from taunts, teasing, and physical 
violence in our schools. This work won’t be easy. This 
requires a fundamental cultural shift in our schools. . . . 
Bullying is a moral and educational issue. It goes to the 
heart of school performance and the ability of a student to 
learn.214 
One commentator has suggested, “What could be more ‘substantially 
disruptive’ to the smooth functioning of an education institution 
than students who are afraid to come to school or who are miserable 
once they arrive?”215 
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What a student can express through speech that constitutes 
bullying he or she can also express without bullying. The disruptive 
nature of this type of speech, as well as the state’s pressing interest in 
carrying out its educational mission, are both countervailing interests 
that should grant educators limited leeway to implement content-
based restrictions in their regulation of bullying in the public school 
setting. Due to the compelling imperative of effectively educating our 
youth in a safe and conducive environment, the principle of content 
neutrality should not apply or should at least be relaxed in the 
context of restricting student speech that constitutes bullying. 
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